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Don’t Let the Green Grass Fool You:
Green Contingent Convertible Bonds and
their Role in the Pursuit of a Sustainable
Economy
EYOLF AARØ*

ABSTRACT
This paper exposes some prominent issues that arise when banks label
their contingent convertible bonds (CoCos) as “green,” and proposes a
mechanism to improve green CoCos as climate change mitigation
instruments. The green label is weakly protected due to regulatory
requirements for capital instruments issued by banks. Current and proposed
green bond frameworks, when applied to standard green bonds are
insufficient in ensuring real environmental impacts from the bonds, are not
prepared for the novelty of labeling CoCos as green. The result is a financial
instrument through which issuing banks unsuccessfully try to achieve both
regulatory and environmental aims. The paper also demonstrates that the
legality of green CoCos under eligibility criteria for capital instruments is
questionable. Thus, this paper argues that they are unsuitable as climate
change tools unless regulatory changes are made. The paper explores ringfencing of banks’ green assets into separate legal entities as one such
possible change. Ring-fencing, the paper argues, would increase the effect
of green CoCos as a climate change tool and make them more than just
another form of greenwashing.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND
Climate change is arguably the greatest challenge faced by humankind.1
Failure to avoid an excessive rise in global average temperature relative to
pre-industrial levels will result in drastic changes to the planet, endangering
life as we know it.2 In 2015, 196 of the world’s nations adopted the Paris
Agreement,3 aiming to limit temperature rise to 1,5 °C.4 The nations made
the commitment to 1,5 °C firmer at COP26 in Glasgow in November 2021.5
Achieving this goal will require unprecedented action and dedication from
all parties. The Paris Agreement stipulates the use of finance as a tool to
lower greenhouse gas emissions and promote a climate resilient
development,6 and with good reason: Sustainability projects are often capital
intensive,7 and immense amounts of capital are needed to power the shift
towards a sustainable world.8
“Green finance” has emerged to tailor to this need.9 A widely used green
financial instrument is green bonds. In essence, green bonds are regular
1. The United Nations Environment Programme estimates that we need to cut global greenhouse
gas emissions by 7.6% every year between 2020 and 2030 to limit global warming to 1.5 °C above preindustrial levels, see U.N. Env’t Programme, Emissions Gap Report 2019, 26 (2019),
https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/30797/EGR2019.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=
y. The European Environment Agency simply states that “[c]limate change is one of the biggest
challenges of our times”, see EUR. ENV’T AGENCY, https://www.eea.europa.eu/themes/climate/climatechange-is-one-of (last visited Jan. 26, 2022). In the recital of the UNFCCC of 1992, the parties
acknowledge “that change in the Earth’s climate and its adverse effects are a common concern of
humankind . . . .” United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, S. Treaty
Doc No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107.
2. The IPCC 2021 report describes several of the challenges we must overcome to save the planet,
such as rising sea levels and more intense and frequent extreme weather, forcing large populations to
emigrate. Valérie Masson-Delmotte et al. eds., Summary for Policymakers, in Climate Change 2021: The
Physical Science Basis. Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC) (Aug. 7, 2021),
https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGI_SPM_final.pdf.
3. Paris Agreement to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 12, 2015, T.I.A.S.
No. 16-1104.
4. Id. at 3.
5. See Glasgow Climate Pact, P 21, U.N. Doc. FCCC/PA/CMA/2021/L.16 (Nov. 13, 2021)
(“resolves to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C . . . “).
6. Paris Agreement to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note 3, at 3.
7. OECD, Mobilising Green Bond Markets for a Low-Carbon Transition, GREEN FIN. AND INV.
21-22 (2017), https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/environment/mobilising-bond-markets-for-a-low-carbontransition_9789264272323-en#page1.
8. One report estimates the cost of reaching the 1.5 °C target to be $131 trillion between now and
2050, see INTERNATIONAL RENEWABLE ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY TRANSITIONS OUTLOOK: 1.5
°C PATHWAY 28 (June 2021). The 2017 OECD report estimates that the transition to a low-carbon future
requires $89 trillion in infrastructure investments over the next 15 years. OECD, supra note 7, at 18. In
comparison, the world’s GDP in 2020 was $84,9 trillion (a decrease from 87.3 in 2019 due to Covid-19),
see STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/268750/global-gross-domestic-product-gdp/ (last
visited Jan. 21, 2022). Statista’s estimation for the 2021 world GDP is $ 94.9 trillion. Id.
9. Empirical analysis identifies green finance as the best financial strategy for reducing CO2
emissions. Muhammad Saeed Meo & Mohd Zaini Abd Karim, The role of green finance in reducing CO2
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bonds whose proceeds are applied toward green projects.10 Since their
inception in 2007, the issuance of green bonds has grown rapidly.11 Several
types of entities may issue green bonds—companies, governments, NGOs,
and banks. Banks sometimes issue a special kind of instrument known as
contingent convertible bonds (CoCos). These are debt instruments that
convert to bank equity upon the occurrence of a pre-determined trigger
event.12 A novelty in green finance is the labeling of CoCos as green. The
nascent green bond market is littered with issues regarding transparency,
accountability, and legitimacy. Green CoCos raise issues of their own, on
top of those related to conventional green bonds.
B. PROBLEM
Given the seriousness of the climate crisis, one might assume that any
tool created to try to mitigate climate change should be welcomed. This
paper argues otherwise. Issuers of green CoCos try to make these instruments
be both a financial tool and a climate change tool. This attempt is
unsuccessful and undermines the original purpose of CoCos—to function as
a regulatory capital instrument in the wake of the 2007–08 financial crisis.
Therefore, regulatory changes are needed if green CoCos are to play an
effective role in the green shift. In the following, I first provide an overview
of the sources of law that I will apply and my methodological approach
(Section I.C). I subsequently define green bonds, briefly touch on bank
capital regulation, and explain green CoCos (Section II) before I assess how
current and proposed regulation of the greenness of bonds applies to CoCos
(Section III). Section III also exposes some adverse consequences of this
regulation. Next, I discuss the legality of green CoCos under the eligibility
criteria for what capital may constitute part of a bank’s own funds,
specifically the requirement that the instrument cannot include any
incentives to redeem the instrument (Section IV). In Section V, I propose
ring-fencing of banks’ green assets as a mechanism to improve green CoCos’
fitness as a climate change tool. Finally, I draw conclusions in Section VI.

emissions:
An
empirical
analysis,
BORSA
ISTANBUL
REV.
(2021),
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214845021000223?via%3Dihub.
10. See infra, Section II, for a more thorough explanation of green bonds.
11. Issuance grew approximately 175 times between 2007 and 2018 when, in comparison, issuance
of ordinary bonds grew by 1.6 times. Caroline Flammer, Green Bonds: Effectiveness and Implications
for Public Policy, in ENVIRONMENTAL AND ENERGY POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 95, 96 (Matthew J.
Kotchen et al. eds., 2020). In 2020, the market reached $1 trillion worth in cumulative green bond
issuance. STATISTA RSCH. DEP’T, The green bond market in Europe - statistics & facts, STATISTA (Dec.
16, 2021), https://www.statista.com/topics/6233/green-bonds-in-europe/#dossierKeyfigures.
12. See, e.g., Angelos Delivorias, Briefing May 2016: Contingent convertible securities: Is a storm
brewing?,
EUR.
PARLIAMENT
RSCH.
SERV.
1
(May
2016),
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/582011/EPRS_BRI(2016)582011_EN.pdf
and TIMO KÖFFER, BASEL III – IMPLICATIONS FOR BANKS’ CAPITAL STRUCTURE: WHAT HAPPENS WITH
HYBRID CAPITAL INSTRUMENTS? 15 (2013).
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C. SOURCES OF LAW AND APPLIED METHODOLOGY
The problem raised in this paper requires solicitation of both legal and
quasi-legal frameworks, covering two main areas of law. One area is the
regulation of financial instruments, and the other is the regulation of bank
capital requirements.
The bond market is regulated by domestic and international securities
laws. In the European Union (EU), which will be the jurisdiction of focus in
this paper, MiFID II13 and MiFIR14 serve as core regulatory frameworks. The
parties’ rights and obligations vis-à-vis each other are primarily contractually
regulated.15 The greenness of bonds is currently regulated mainly by private
governance in the form of market and issuer developed standards.16 Two of
the main market-developed standards are the Green Bond Principles (GBP)
from the International Capital Market Association (ICMA) and the Climate
Bonds Initiative’s Climate Bonds Standard (CBS).17 They contain no threats
13. Directive 2014/65, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets
in financial instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU, 2014 O.J. (L
173) 349.
14. Regulation No 600/2014, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on
markets in financial instruments and amending Regulation No 648/2012, 2014 O.J. (L 173) 84 (EU).
15. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 717 (8th ed. 2021).
16. Some countries, for example Vietnam and China, have developed national standards. See THE
PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA, Notice on Issuing the Green Bond Endorsed Projects Catalogue (2021
Edition), NAT’L DEV. AND REFORM COMM’N & CHINA SEC. REGUL. COMM’N (Apr. 2, 2021) (Unofficial
translation courtesy of the Climate Bonds Initiative), https://www.climatebonds.net/files/files/the-GreenBond-Endorsed-Project-Catalogue-2021-Edition-110521.pdf; Vu Le Bang & Nguyen Thi Thanh Tram,
Vietnam: New corporate green bond legal framework, INT’L FIN. L. REV. (Mar. 18, 2019),
https://www.iflr.com/article/b1lmx9g42gd3rh/vietnam-new-corporate-green-bond-legal-framework
(discussing Vietnam’s legal framework for corporate green bonds under Decree 163/2018/ND-CP). An
example of an issuer-developed standard is Citi’s Green Bond Framework, which “Citigroup Inc and / or
its subsidiaries may issue green bonds in accordance with.” CITIGROUP INC., CITI GREEN BOND
FRAMEWORK
3 (Jan. 2019), https://www.citigroup.com/citi/fixedincome/data/Citi-green-bondframework.pdf. The Framework is developed in line with ICMA’s Green Bond Principles. Id.
17. See ICMA, Voluntary Process Guidelines for Issuing Green Bonds, THE GREEN BOND
PRINCIPLES (June 2021), https://www.icmagroup.org/assets/documents/Sustainable-finance/2021updates/Green-Bond-Principles-June-2021-140621.pdf, and Climate Bonds Initiative (CBI),
International best practice for labelling green investments, CLIMATE BONDS STANDARD VERSION 3.0
(Dec.
2019),
https://www.climatebonds.net/files/files/climate-bonds-standard-v3-20191210.pdf,
respectively. ICMA is a not-for-profit association serving the interests of its members consisting of,
among others, banks, stock exchanges members, securities dealers, and asset and fund managers. See
ICMA, https://www.icmagroup.org/About-ICMA/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2022). CBI is an international
investor-focused not-for-profit organization, more specifically focused on climate-friendly investing. Its
purpose is “to promote large-scale investments that will deliver a low-carbon and climate-resilient global
economy”, aiming to “mobilise investors, industry and government to catalyse green investments at the
speed and scale required to avoid dangerous climate change and meet the goals of the Paris Climate
Agreement”. Climate Bonds Initiative, supra at 3. The drafting of the CBS is overseen by the Climate
Bonds Standard Board, which also awards CBS certifications. The board comprises “large institutional
investors and leading environmental NGOs….” Id. at 4. As of January 2022, the Board consists of seven
entities, among others, California State Teachers Retirement System, Investor Group on Climate Change,
and The Natural Resources Defense Council. Together, the Board members represent USD 51 trillion of
assets under management. Climate Bonds Standard Board, CLIMATE BONDS INITIATIVE,
https://www.climatebonds.net/standard/governance/board (last visited Jan. 13, 2022). The composition
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of sanctions other than revocation of the green label to issuers who breach
such a revocation may have reputational consequences–the standards remain
pure soft law.18 However, there are developments in Europe. In July 2021,
the European Commission put forth a proposal for regulating European
green bonds.19 I will come back to this proposal in section III.
As to prudential regulation,20 the EU framework is vast and detailed.
The EU Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV)21 and Capital
Requirements Regulation (CRR),22 as amended by CRD V23 and CRR II,24
respectively, build on Basel III.25 Basel III is developed by the nongovernmental Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and has no
legal authority.26 Rather, the BCBS relies on the nations and regions of the
and leadership of both ICMA and CBI illuminate the prominent self-regulation that is characteristic for
the green bond space, and the potential conflicts of interest this constellation may create.
18. Further development of the legal framework is seen by many as a necessity for further growth
of the market. See, e.g., Stephen Kim Park, Investors as Regulators: Green Bonds and the Governance
Challenges of the Sustainable Finance Revolution, 54 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 46 (2018): “The future of the
green bond market hinges on its legal infrastructure at least as much as—if not more than—its financial
underpinnings.”
19. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on European Green
Bonds, COM (2021) 391 final (July 6, 2021) [hereinafter the EuGB Proposal].
20. Prudential regulation is rules related to the stability and safety of both financial institutions and
the financial system as a whole. See, e.g., LARISA DRAGOMIR, EUROPEAN PRUDENTIAL BANKING
REGULATION AND SUPERVISION: THE LEGAL DIMENSION 2 (2010): “[P]rudential issues encompass all
those preventive measures intended to ensure the soundness and safety of individual institutions (microprudential aspects) and of the system as a whole (macro-prudential aspects) so as to preclude the
emergence of individual or systematic banking crises.” See also, AUSTRALIAN PRUDENTIAL REGUL.
AUTH. (APRA), https://www.apra.gov.au/what-prudential-regulation (last visited Jan. 13, 2022):
“[P]rudential regulation is a legal framework focused on the financial safety and stability of institutions
and the broader financial system.” EU rules on prudential requirements mainly concern the amount of
capital and liquidity that banks hold. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, https://ec.europa.eu/info/businesseconomy-euro/banking-and-finance/financial-supervision-and-risk-management/managing-risks-banksand-financial-institutions/prudential-requirements_en (last visited Jan. 13, 2022).
21. Directive 2013/36, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to
the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms,
amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC, 2013 O.J. (L
176) 338 [hereinafter CRD IV].
22. Regulation No 575/2013, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on
prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No
648/2012 Text with EEA relevance, 2013 O.J. (L 176) 1 [hereinafter CRR].
23. Directive 2019/878, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 amending
Directive 2013/36/EU as regards exempted entities, financial holding companies, mixed financial holding
companies, remuneration, supervisory measures and powers and capital conservation measures, 2019 O.J.
(L 150) 253.
24. Regulation 2019/876, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 amending
Regulation 575/2013 as regards to the leverage ratio, the net stable funding ratio, requirements for own
funds and eligible liabilities, counterparty credit risk, market risk, exposures to central counterparties,
exposures to collective investment undertakings, large exposures, reporting and disclosure requirements,
and Regulation 648/2012, 2019 O.J. (L 150) 1, 225.
25. BIS, THE BASEL FRAMEWORK, https://www.bis.org/basel_framework/index.htm?m=3_14_697
(last visited Nov. 24, 2021).
26. BIS, BASEL COMMITTEE CHARTER Article 3, https://www.bis.org/bcbs/charter.htm. BCBS
members include organizations with “direct banking supervisory authority and central banks.” Id. Article
4. This includes 45 institutions from 28 jurisdictions, among them major powers such as the EU, the US,
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Committee members to implement its decisions and recommendations as
law.27
When interpreting EU legislative acts, EU legal method must be
applied. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) laid out its rules of
interpretation in CILFIT.28 The starting point is the natural meaning of the
provision’s language, comparing the equally authentic language versions.29
The Court underlines that legal concepts may not have the same meaning in
EU law and the Member States’ national law.30 EU law provisions must
furthermore be placed in their context and read “in the light of the provisions
of community law as a whole, regard being had to the objectives thereof and
to its state of evolution at the date on which the provision in question is to be
applied.”31 These guidelines will govern the interpretation of the CRD IV,
the CRR, and the European green bond standard proposal. Regarding the
EU’s state of evolution at the time of application entails that the Union’s
green objectives, as expressed in the EU Green Deal,32 will guide the
interpretation. Case law from EU courts interpreting the provisions of EU
legislative acts relevant to this paper, is scarce. Other EU institutions,
however, have published comments and guidelines.33 EBA is an important
prudential regulator in the EU and has wide discretion in determining the
eligibility of instruments as capital instruments. Therefore, the regulator’s
view, expressed through reports or other statements, carries weight in
interpreting eligibility criteria under the CRR.

II. GREEN BONDS, BANK CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS, AND COCOS
A. DEFINING A GREEN BOND
A bond is essentially a certificate of indebtedness,34 issued by
corporations, governments, and non-governmental organizations to borrow
and China. See BIS, BASEL COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP, https://www.bis.org/bcbs/membership.htm (last
visited Nov. 24, 2021).
27. BASEL COMMITTEE CHARTER Article 3.
28. Case 283/81, Srl. CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v. Ministry of Health, 1982 E.C.R.
3415.
29. Id., at para. 18.
30. Id., at para. 19.
31. Id., at para. 20.
32. The European Green Deal Investment Plan of January 14, 2020, “is the Union’s response to the
climate and environment-related challenges that are this generation’s defining task. It is a new growth
strategy this generation. It aims to transform the Union into a modern, resource-efficient and competitive
economy with no net emissions of greenhouse gases by 2050.” EuGB Proposal, supra note 19, at 4.
33. See, e.g., European Banking Authority, EBA REPORT ON THE MONITORING OF ADDITIONAL
TIER 1 (AT1) INSTRUMENTS OF EUROPEAN UNION (EU) INSTITUTIONS – UPDATE, EBA/REP/2021/19
(June
24,
2021),
https://www.eba.europa.eu/sites/default/documents/files/document_library/Publications/Reports/2021/1
015682/Report%20on%20the%20monitoring%20of%20Additional%20Tier%201%20instruments%20o
f%20EU%20institutions.pdf.
34. American Bar Association. Young Lawyers Division. Securities Law Committee. Securities Law
Glossary. (1991).
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money from the market.35 Investors lend long-term capital to issuers by
purchasing their bonds.36 These investors become bondholders. As
compensation for their credit risk, bondholders receive regular interest
payments until the bond matures or otherwise retires,37 and the issuer repays
the principal. The large number of bondholders enables the issuer to lend
larger sums of money cheaper than it would through a bilateral or syndicated
bank loan.38 This feature is especially attractive to governments and
corporations developing capital intensive sustainability projects where the
financial returns are slow.
Green bonds are financially structured similarly to conventional
bonds.39 The term “green finance” is generally used to describe any
structured financial activity created to improve environmental outcomes. 40
Therefore, the main difference between green and conventional bonds, lies
in how the bond proceeds are used. The term “green”, however, is inherently
ambiguous. Several attempts have been made to coin a more precise term.41
One can combine the definition of a bond with a general explanation of green
finance, making green bonds “fixed-income instruments aimed at financing
environmental and sustainable development projects42 or debt securities that
link “finance to projects that claim environmental benefits.”43 The Climate
Bonds Standard defines a green bond as “[a] bond … where the proceeds
will be exclusively applied to finance or re-finance, in part or in full, new
and/or existing eligible green projects, and which is aligned with the four
core components of the Green Bond Principles or the Green Loan
Principles.”44 The definitions, although not completely harmonious,
illustrate the essential difference between a green and conventional bond:
green bonds finance sustainable projects in some form. However,
determining which securities deserve the label “green,” remains one of the

35. Ryan Jones, et al., Treating Ecological Deficit with Debt: The Practical and Political Concerns
with
Green
Bonds,
114
GEOFORUM
49,
50
(2020),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7274626/.
36. Id.
37. Id. It is not uncommon that bonds are callable or redeemable. Such bonds can be paid off by the
issuer prematurely. Because their rate of return is known to the investor, bonds are commonly known as
a type of fixed income instruments. See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Callable or
Redeemable Bonds, INVESTOR.GOV, https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/investingbasics/glossary/callable-or-redeemable-bonds (last visited Jan. 26, 2022).
38. See OECD, supra note 7, at 21.
39. Ryan Jones, et al., supra note 35, at 50.
40. Sean Fleming, What is Green Finance and Why Is It Important?, WORLD ECON. F. (Nov. 9,
2020), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/11/what-is-green-finance/.
41. See Nannette Lindenberg, DEFINITION OF GREEN FINANCE 1-2 (June 6, 2014),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2446496, with further references.
42. Pauline Deschryver & Frederic de Mariz, What Future for the Green Bond Market? How Can
Policymakers, Companies, and Investors Unlock the Potential of the Green Bond Market?, 13(3) 61 J. OF
RISK AND FIN. MGMT. 2 (2020), https://doi.org/10.3390/jrfm13030061.
43. Ryan Jones, et al., supra note 35, at 49.
44. Climate Bonds Initiative, supra note 17, at 8.
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main challenges facing the market in its search for further growth,
transparency, and legitimacy.
A special type of bonds are convertible bonds. Holders of convertible
bonds may convert the bonds into common stock or other securities of the
issuer.45 As such, convertible bonds are hybrid securities—they combine
debt and equity features in one instrument.46 Convertible bonds may be
labeled green under the same standards as conventional bonds.47 Another
novel development in the green finance sphere is to label contingent
convertible bonds, or “CoCos,” as green.48 This instrument is the focus of
this paper. To explain CoCos, it is necessary to first briefly explain the
regulation of bank capital requirements.
B. BANK CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS IN THE EU
Under prudential regulatory frameworks, banks must maintain certain
minimum capital requirements49 (i.e., a certain amount of assets). A bank’s
assets consist of loans, securities, and other claims on customers.50 The bank
finances these assets with capital instruments, customer obligations, and
senior debt.51 The capital instruments are made up of obligations of the
bank’s investors and are divided into Common Equity Tier 1 capital (CET1),
Additional Tier 1 capital (AT1), and Tier 2 capital (T2).52 Chapter 4 of CRD
IV regulates capital buffers,53 while Chapter 3, Section 1 of CRR sets out the
criteria for financial instruments to qualify as AT1 capital.
The purpose of these requirements is to ensure the solvency of
institutions and thus avoid a disturbance of banks as critical institutions in
45. William W. Bratton, The Economics and Jurisprudence of Convertible Bonds, 1984 WIS. L. REV.
667, 669 (1984).
46. Id. See also, KAMIL LIBERADZKI & MARCIN LIBERADZKI, HYBRID SECURITIES: STRUCTURING,
PRICING AND RISK MANAGEMENT 1-2 (1st ed. 2016) (describing convertible bonds as “transforming”
instruments).
47. An example is renewable energy producer Neoen’s 2020 €170 million European green
convertible bond issue, aligned with the GBP and the main provisions of the proposed EU Green Bond
Standard, verified by external reviewer Vigeo Eiris. See Vigeo Eiris, Vigeo Eiris has Provided an SPO
on the Sustainability of Neoen’s Green Bond Framework, VIGEO EIRIS: COMPANY AND ORGANIZATION
NEWS (June 4, 2020), https://vigeo-eiris.com/vigeo-eiris-has-provided-an-spo-on-the-sustainability-ofneoens-green-bond/.
48. One example is the bank BBVA’s 2020 €1 billion green hybrid bond issue. See BBVA, BBVA
raises €1bn in first-ever green CoCo bond by a financial institution, BBVA COMMUNICATIONS (July 8,
2020),
https://www.bbva.com/en/bbva-is-the-first-financial-institution-in-the-world-to-issue-greencoco-bonds/.
49. See, e.g., CRD IV, supra note 21, at Chapter 4.
50. Thomas Huertas, A Resolvable Bank (2015). Chapter in Making Failure Feasible: How
Bankruptcy Reform Can End Too Big to Fail 132 (Ken Scott & John Taylor eds., 2015),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2571176.
51. Id.
52. BIS, supra note 25, at Article 10.1; CRR Articles 4(71), 72, and 25. See also Latham & Watkins,
Contingent Convertible Bonds in the European Union: Structuring Considerations and Current Legal
Issues,
1373
CLIENT
ALERT
NUMBER
1-2
(July
24,
2012),
https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/contingent-convertible-bonds-eu.
53. See, especially, Articles 129-33 and 141-42.
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society.54 By requiring banks to maintain capital buffers, taxpayers are less
likely to suffer through the types of bail-out that were necessary under the
2007–08 financial crisis.55 Contingent convertible bonds are meant to
alleviate some of the restraints that prudential regulations impose on the
banks, such as limitations on banks’ ability to grant loans.
C. GREEN CONTINGENT CONVERTIBLE BONDS
Capital requirements are the background for why banks are the main
issuers of contingent convertible bonds.56 This is debt that banks can issue
and that converts into equity under certain conditions. CoCos’ hybrid
nature—the combination of debt and equity—allows banks to count CoCos’
value towards their AT1 capital, thus making it easier to maintain their
capital buffers. They are in a sense “bail-out” bonds, but the bail-out comes
from the bondholders and not the public. Because of CoCos’ function as
AT1-boosters, they are commonly referred to as AT1 bonds when they are
issued by banks.
CoCos have two main characteristics: a trigger mechanism and a loss
absorption mechanism.57 This distinguishes CoCos from simple convertible
bonds, where the investors freely choose when to convert the bonds into
equity.58 The trigger is important because it determines the probability, and
therefore, the risk of conversion.59 The trigger can be either mechanical,
discretionary, or a combination of both features.60 While mechanical triggers
are based on either market value or book value of the issuing bank,
discretional triggers are activated by a supervisory authority (i.e., a
prudential regulator.)61 The loss absorption mechanism either converts the
debt into equity at a predetermined rate or writes down the principal by
reducing the book value of the debt.62 While CET1 is the primary source of
loss absorption, and the most expensive, AT1 equity instruments “are
intended to absorb low-probability, relatively high-impact losses, such as
54. CRD IV Recital (34). See also CRR Recital (32) (“Considering the devastating effects of the
latest financial crisis the overall objectives of this Regulation are to encourage economically useful
banking activities that serve the general interest and to discourage unsustainable financial speculation
without real added value.”).
55. CRD IV Recital (34) (“If, notwithstanding the solvency requirements, a crisis occurs, it is
necessary to ensure that institutions can be resolved in an orderly manner, limiting the negative impact
on the real economy and avoiding the need for taxpayers to step in.”).
56. CoCos are also issued by insurance companies and other financial institutions.
57. CRR Article 52(1)(n). See also, Delivorias, supra note 12. KÖFFER, supra note 12. Köffer defines
contingent convertible bonds as “[a] convertible bond which automatically converts into a previous
amount of shares when a pre-set trigger is reached within the duration of the bond.”
58. The loss absorption mechanism also makes CoCos a riskier investment than conventional seniorranked bonds.
59. KÖFFER, supra note 12, at 24.
60. Delivorias, supra note 12.
61. Jan De Spiegeleer & Wim Schoutens, SUSTAINABLE CAPITAL INSTRUMENTS AND THEIR ROLE
IN
PRUDENTIAL
POLICY:
REVERSE
GREEN
BONDS
7
(July
4,
2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3415184.
62. Delivorias, supra note 12, at 4.

Winter 2023

DON’T LET THE GREEN GRASS FOOL YOU

41

those that would cause the bank to breach a minimum requirement or become
insolvent.”63
The main effect of CoCos, therefore, is to allow banks to be self-funded
and fulfill their capital requirements more cheaply than they would with
equity.64 These instruments can repair balance sheets or facilitate orderly
resolutions of banks, without necessitating issuance of extra equity by banks
in crises.65 Triggering CoCos is “a quick and effective way” of bringing a
bank that has incurred losses back on sounder financial footing.66 Moreover,
the shift of the costs of bank failure from taxpayers to equity and debt
investors incentivizes the investors to more closely monitor the banks.67
The rationale behind green CoCos, in addition to that behind CoCos in
general, is essentially the same for green conventional bonds: to funnel
capital towards sustainable activities. Issuers might also pursue reputational
benefits68 by highlighting green objectives and dedications to all its
stakeholders.69 And, naturally, green bonds can help issuers achieve those
objectives.70 However, CoCos are still, first and foremost, a financial tool to
maintain bank capital requirements. Their regulatory functions differentiate
CoCos from other financial instruments that in recent years have been used
in attempts, with varying degrees of success, to promote sustainability. Such
instruments include equities like green index funds or actively managed
portfolios.71 Green CoCos are also different from any green conventional
63. Id. at 3.
64. Id. at 1.
65. Id.
66. Stefan Avdjiev, et al., COCO BOND ISSUANCE AND BANK FUNDING COSTS (2015),
https://www.aeaweb.org/conference/2016/retrieve.php?pdfid=12867&tk=8yHfbDKy. CoCos also face
criticism, see, Delivorias, supra note 12, at 6-7. An analysis of CoCos in themselves is outside the scope
of this paper.
67. See Natalya Martynova & Enrico Perotti, Convertible bonds and bank risk-taking, 480 DNB
WORKING PAPER 1 (Aug. 2015), https://www.dnb.nl/media/wk2lxkc5/working-paper-480.pdf;
Delivorias, supra note 12, at 6.
68. BANK+INSURANCE HYBRID CAPITAL, GREENING BANK CAPITAL 34 (2Q 2018),
http://bihcapital.com/wp-content/uploads/bihc15.pdf: (comment from participant John Arne Wang)
(“Green capital would also be about messaging . . .”).
69. EU TECHNICAL EXPERT GROUP ON SUSTAINABLE FINANCE, FINANCING A SUSTAINABLE
EUROPEAN ECONOMY: REPORT ON EU GREEN BOND STANDARD 19 (June 18, 2019),
https://ec.europa.eu/info/files/190618-sustainable-finance-teg-report-green-bond-standard_en.
70. BBVA, for example, states that its green CoCo contributes toward the bank’s objective of
“[h]elping [its] clients transition toward a sustainable future.” BBVA, supra note 48. The bank has
committed to providing €100 billion in sustainable financing by 2025. See Charlene Malik, Green AT1
Raises More Questions Than Answers, VONTOBEL: TWENTYFOUR ASSET MGMT. (July 7, 2020),
https://am.vontobel.com/en/insights/green-at1-raises-more-questions-than-answers.
71. James Chen, What is Green Investing?, INVESTOPEDIA (Sept. 12, 2021),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/green-investing.asp (last visited Jan. 23, 2022) (naming “green
bonds, green ETFs, green index funds, green mutual funds, or hold[ing] stock in environmentally-friendly
companies to support green initiatives” as examples of green investments). While such instruments may
prove good investments financially, the actual environmental impact may be questionable. See, e.g., Jan
P. Krahnen et al., A primer on green finance: From wishful thinking to marginal impact, 87 SAFE WHITE
PAPER
(Oct.
2021),
https://safefrankfurt.de/fileadmin/user_upload/editor_common/Policy_Center/SAFE_White_Paper_No._87.pdf.
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bonds a bank may issue because these bonds do not convert to equity, thereby
dodging the issues highlighted below in Section III.C. The vast range of
already existing options for corporations to pursue environmental objectives
should prompt scrutinous review of any novel instrument’s eligibility as a
climate change tool. For green CoCos, at least one important question arises:
What happens when sustainability objectives of a bank issuing green CoCos
clash with prudential regulation? And if the sustainability objectives yield in
this conflict, what is left of the issuer’s green commitments?

III. PROTECTION OF THE GREEN LABEL UPON CONVERSION OF A
GREEN COCO
A. IMPLICATIONS OF CONVERSION UNDER CURRENT REGULATION OF
GREENNESS
Upon conversion, CoCos cover losses across the whole balance sheet
of the bank, regardless of whether those losses relate to green assets or not.72
Currently, the regulatory function of AT1 instruments prohibits mechanisms
that prevent this entity-wide coverage.73 Therefore, the voluntary standards
that govern the greenness of bonds, such as the GBP and the CBS, are
inadequate to regulate green CoCos. These instruments are not mentioned in
the GBP and appear to be ineligible for certification under the CBS.74 The
first ever issuer of a green CoCo, the Spanish bank BBVA, does apply the
GBP eligibility criteria in the bank’s definition of “Green Projects” that may
be funded through its green CoCo.75 However, any initial eligibility of the
bond is necessarily unprotected upon conversion, exactly because the debt
converted to capital may be applied to absorb losses across the whole balance

72. Under CRR Article 52(1)(f), the instruments cannot be subject to “any arrangement . . . that
enhances the seniority of the claim under the instruments in insolvency or liquidation” and under Article
52(1)(o), the provisions governing the instruments cannot include any feature that could “hinder the
recapitalisation of the institution.”
73. See European Banking Authority, supra note 33, at 33. (“From a regulatory perspective, it is key
to guarantee that there is no direct link between the ESG assets and the notes.”) EBA wants issuers to
include “explicit provisions in the documentation stating that proceeds from own funds and eligible
liabilities issuances should cover all losses in the balance sheet regardless of whether the bonds are
labelled Green or ESG and regardless of whether the losses stem from Green/ESG assets or other assets.”
Id.
74. Annex 1 to the CBS lists the “[b]onds, loans and other debt instruments which are eligible” for
certification. Climate Bonds Initiative, supra note 17, at 30. The wording “[t]he following types of debt
instruments are eligible for Certification” suggests that the list is exhaustive. Convertible bonds, which
investors have “the right but not the obligation” to convert, are listed, but not contingent convertible
bonds. Id. Investors are, as mentioned above, obliged to convert these bonds upon occurrence of the
trigger event.
75. BBVA, SERIES 10 €1,000,000,000 NON-STEP-UP NON-CUMULATIVE CONTINGENT
CONVERTIBLE PERPETUAL PREFERRED TIER 1 GREEN SECURITIES 140 (July 16, 2020),
https://shareholdersandinvestors.bbva.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/2020-07-15-BBVA-FolletoAT1-VERSIÓN-FINAL.pdf [hereinafter BBVA Prospectus]. With its 2020 €1 billion AT1 issue, BBVA
became the first bank to issue a green CoCo. BBVA, supra note 48.
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sheet of the bank. In other words: the bank’s sustainability objectives yield
to prudential regulation.
B. IMPLICATIONS OF CONVERSION UNDER THE PROPOSED EU REGULATION
ON GREEN BONDS
i. Background of the EuGB Proposal
In June 2021, the European Commission proposed an EU regulation on
green bonds (the “EuGB Proposal”) as part of the broader EU agenda on
sustainable finance.76 The EuGB Proposal sets out “uniform requirements for
issuers of bonds that wish to use the designation ‘European green bond’ or
‘EuGB,’” and “establishes a registration system and supervisory framework
for external reviewers” of such bonds.77 The Commission wants to “facilitate
further developing the market for high-quality green bonds, thereby
contributing to the Capital Markets Union, while minimizing disruption to
existing green bond markets and reducing the risk of greenwashing.”78 And
aiming to operationalize targets formulated in the EU Green Deal,79 the
Commission anchors the standard in the EU Taxonomy Regulation.80 A core
requirement under the EuGB Proposal is that the use of proceeds “shall relate
to economic activities that meet the taxonomy requirements . . . .” or will
meet them within a certain time.81 This provides an unprecedented system
for classifying activities as eligible for financing from green bonds and may
greatly improve the legitimacy and accountability of the green bond market.
ii. The EuGB Proposal’s Application to CoCos
The proposed regulation will apply to “bonds.”82 Under its plain
meaning, this includes any type of bond, including contingent convertible
bonds. The term is not further defined neither in the EuGB Proposal nor other
EU legislative acts. Article 4(1) does admittedly state which assets the
proceeds must be allocated to “[b]efore the maturity of the bond . . . .” This
76. EuGB Proposal, supra note 19.
77. Id. at Article 1.
78. Id. The Capital Markets Union (CMU) is “a plan to create a single market for capital. The aim
is to get money – investments and savings – flowing across the EU so that it can benefit consumers,
investors and companies, regardless of where they are located.” EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/growth-and-investment/capital-markets-union/whatcapital-markets-union_en (last visited Jan. 22, 2021). Among the main objectives is to “help Europe
deliver its New Green Deal and Digital Agenda.” Id.
79. The European Green Deal Investment Plan of January 14, 2020, “is the Union’s response to the
climate and environment-related challenges that define this generation. It aims to transform the Union
into a modern, resource-efficient and competitive economy with no net emissions of greenhouse gases by
2050.” EuGB Proposal, supra note 19, at 4.
80. Regulation (EU) 2020/852, of the European Parliament and of the Council of June 18, 2020, on
the establishment of a framework to facilitate sustainable investment, and amending Regulation (EU)
2019/2088. 2020 O.J. (L 198) 13, 43 [hereinafter the EU Taxonomy Regulation].
81. EuGB Proposal, supra note 19, at Article 6(1).
82. Id. at Article 1.
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phrasing may implicitly suggest that the bond cannot be perpetual. CoCos
are perpetual instruments.83 However, a bond without a maturity date would
also be able to fulfill the criteria: If maturity by definition never happens, the
allocation can still happen “before maturity.” Furthermore, the Commission
comments on the relationship to CRD IV. A EuGB designation “is without
prejudice to the requirements of” CRD IV, and the EuGB Proposal should
not “be interpreted as restricting the power to write down or convert relevant
capital instruments or liabilities of an institution pursuant to” that directive.
These comments imply that capital instruments such as CoCos may be
labeled green under the European standard. However, the statement also
shows that the EuGB Proposal does not offer any stronger protection of the
green label upon conversion than what the current standards for green labels
do. The Commission’s weighing of interests, from which the interest of
preserving financial stability comes out heavier than the interest of
increasing the accountability of the green bond market, illustrates and
highlights CoCos’ inadequacy as a climate change tool without regulatory
amendments.
C. SOME CONSEQUENCES OF INADEQUATE REGULATION
The current and proposed regulation of the greenness of bonds exposes
several weaknesses in how any type of bonds, hereunder CoCos, ensure
actual, positive environmental impacts. Here, I will discuss a few of them,
using the terms of the BBVA green CoCo issue as an illustration.
i. The regulation allows for vague and flexible sustainability commitments
According to the prospectus (the “Prospectus”), BBVA will apply “[a]n
amount equal to the net proceeds from the issue” to finance or refinance
green projects on a portfolio basis.84 If the bank follows through, they will
dedicate almost €1 billion to green activities. From an environmental
perspective, that would naturally be beneficial. Put the terms under stricter
scrutiny, however, and the commitments towards sustainability goals appear
vague, unable to guarantee any environmental benefits.
It is the “intention” of BBVA to apply the proceeds towards green
projects, but there can be “no assurance” that the bank will be able to do
this.85 The plain meaning of the word “intention” is merely to want to
accomplish something. The language entails no legally binding commitment
83. See, e.g., CRR Article 52(1)(g).
84. BBVA Prospectus, supra note 75, at 140.
85. Id. at 41. Furthermore, on page 140 of the Prospectus, BBVA states that it “will endeavour to
apply a percentage of the net proceeds of the Preferred Securities in financing Green Projects originated
in 2020.” Id. at 140. Some have interpreted “endeavor to apply a percentage of the net proceeds” as
relating to any use of the proceeds at all, see Malik, supra note 70. A contextual read of the terms,
however, makes it clear that the “endeavour” ties to applying a percentage of proceeds towards green
projects from 2020. The overall commitment remains to spend an amount “equal to the net proceeds”
towards green projects, but projects of any age.
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to achieve specific results—the green objectives are to be pursued on a besteffort basis. Moreover, the “intention” only covers using the proceeds
“substantially in” the manner as described in the Prospectus.86 BBVA also
makes a disclaimer as to the completion 87
BBVA does exclude financing of certain activities. The proceeds “will
not be used” to finance, among other things, nuclear power generation,
“carbon related” activities, or oil and gas activities.88 The term “carbon
related” is broad. Its plain meaning excludes large parts of possible nongreen investments. However, not all non-green investments are
environmentally damaging because of their connection to carbon. Under the
EU Taxonomy Regulation, for example, an economic activity does not
qualify as environmentally sustainable if it “significantly harm[s]” the
“sustainable use and protection of water and marine resources,” where that
activity is “detrimental . . . to the good environmental status of marine waters
. . . .”89 Such activities are not explicitly excluded under BBVA’s own
framework.
The language “will not be used” indicates that BBVA obliges itself to
not use bond proceeds towards the listed activities. The bank’s green bond
framework seems to confirm such an interpretation. In their Sustainable
Developments Goals (SDGs), BBVA emphasizes that bond proceeds will
“not . . . under any circumstances” be used towards these activities.90 This
seemingly contradicts the best-effort commitment in the Prospectus, even
more so when the Prospectus defines “Green Projects” as those projects
eligible under BBVA’s own SDGs, the GBP, or the EU Taxonomy
Regulation.91 The SDGs, however, do not constitute a legal obligation. The
Prospectus explicitly states that “[n]either the SDGs Bond Framework, nor
any of the . . . reports [or] verification assessments . . . are incorporated in or
form part of” the Prospectus.92 A breach of the SDGs would therefore not be
sanctionable under the EU Prospectus Regulation.93 And because the
framework in itself constitutes no formal regulation, breaching it would also
be without any other legal consequences.
86. BBVA Prospectus, supra note 74, at 41.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 140.
89. EU Taxonomy Regulation Article 17(1)(c)(ii). Cf. Article 3(b).
90. BBVA, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS (SDGS) BOND FRAMEWORK 6 (Apr. 2018),
https://shareholdersandinvestors.bbva.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/BBVA-SDGs-BondFramework_23042018_Eng.pdf [hereinafter BBVA SDGs]. The SDGs are BBVA’s green bond
framework.
91. BBVA Prospectus, supra note 75, at 140. Green Eligible Categories under BBVA’s framework
are energy efficiency, sustainable transport, water, waste management, and renewable energy, see BBVA
SDGs, supra note 89, at 5.
92. BBVA Prospectus, supra note 75, at 140.
93. Regulation (EU) 2017/1129, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on
the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading on a
regulated market, and repealing Directive 2003/71/EC, 2017 O.J. (L 168) 12, 82 [hereinafter the
Prospectus Regulation].
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A final remark to the vagueness of BBVA’s commitments, relates to the
question of what happens when green projects cease to exist. An important
feature of CoCos is that they are perpetual,94 meaning that they have no
maturity date.95 Meanwhile, current green bond frameworks are linked to
assets when defining eligible uses of proceeds. For banks, this means that
the frameworks are linked to the loans they are providing in the green sector.
Unlike CoCos, assets are not perpetual. Therefore, the banks need to keep a
sufficiently large pipeline of green projects to fund with the bond proceeds
to not violate the framework during the lifetime of the bond. This creates an
additional burden for issuing banks as they need to commit, virtually in
perpetuity, to re-plenish and maintain their green portfolios. For this reason,
some market practitioners even claim that the concepts on which the current
green bond frameworks are built—mainly the use-of-proceeds model—do
not work for capital instruments such as AT1s.96 Nonetheless, BBVA has
apparently taken on this additional burden. BBVA claims it will substitute
financed green projects that cease to exist or cease to be eligible, with a
compliant green project within the relevant portfolio.97 However, the
documentation does not solve the issue of what happens when there are no
compliant substitutes available. Since the pursuit of the green objectives is a
best-effort commitment, it is reasonable to understand the documentation’s
silence as that BBVA simply will not reinvest in green projects should their
portfolio be empty.
The commitments are not only vague—they are also flexible, seemingly
undermining the outwardly expressed intention of making green
investments. It is sufficient for meeting BBVA’s definition of green projects
that either 80% of the amount of financing is used for eligible projects, or
that 80% of the business of the borrower of the funds falls under the eligible
projects.98 Eligible project types are, as mentioned, those listed in BBVA’s
own framework, the GBP, or the EU Taxonomy Regulation.99 Although 80%
is a substantial amount, it leaves room for circumvention. In theory, a
borrower may receive funds from BBVA and spend them on the 20% of its
business that is not green, and the projects would still count towards BBVA’s
green portfolio. That would constitute a flagrant example of greenwashing.
Since green finance also is about messaging, one could hope that both BBVA
and borrowers avoid such solutions. Legally, however, there are no
obstacles. Obtaining and publishing “the relevant reports, assessments,
opinions and certifications” as defined in the terms and SDGs, efforts that

94. See, e.g., CRR Article 52(1)(g).
95. James
Chen,
Perpetual
Bond,
INVESTOPEDIA
(Mar.
19,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/perpetualbond.asp (last visited Jan. 22, 2022).
96. See BIHCapital, supra note 68, at 27 (a comment from participant John Arne Wang).
97. BBVA Prospectus, supra note 75, at 140.
98. Id.
99. Id.

2020),
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are meant to increase transparency and accountability as to the greenness of
the instrument,100 are merely committed to on a best-effort basis.101
If it were to be shown that the issuer violated any of these vague terms,
the investor protection is weak. Such a violation is often referred to as a
“green default,” and the limited recourse investors have in these situations is
a problem that relates to all green finance instruments.102 Events of default
are predefined circumstances that would put the borrower in breach of
contract,103 set out in the bond documentation. If such an event occurs, the
lender may usually demand full repayment immediately. The function of
these clauses is to provide recourse for the bondholders should the issuer
fault. A “green default,” therefore, occurs if the issuer defaults on its
environmental objectives and commitments.104 While conventional events of
default normally tie to financial circumstances, green defaults are nonfinancial.
The BBVA Prospectus states that there are “no events of default” for
the CoCo.105 Nor will a green default give rise to any claims against the
bank.106 The bank openly admits that this can have adverse effects for
investors,107 especially for investors with specific mandates to maintain a
certain portion of its portfolio green.108 Such investors may face sanctions of
its own should they breach the mandates. Nor is it a good option to include
a sustainability trigger or call option. Similar solutions have successfully
100. Such measures are recommended under ICMA’s GBP and required under CBI’s CBS. See
ICMA, supra note 17, and Climate Bonds Initiative, supra note 17.
101. BBVA Prospectus, supra note 75, at 40.
102. Leading practice in the green bond market is to include a disclaimer saying that loss of green
certification does not constitute an event of default. Clare Corke, Julie Myers & Cameron Busch, Green
Bonds Series: Part 4 - When “green” bonds go brown, LEXOLOGY (Oct. 17, 2019),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=0a6503d3-d4ff-44fc-ab2b-5166c157f630. See also,
Lloyd Freeburn & Ian Ramsay, Green Bonds: Legal and Policy Issues, 15:4 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 418, 441
(2020), htthttps://ssrn.com/abstract=3715969.
103. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 34, defining “default” as “the failure to fulfill a
contract.” Default generally “refers to the failure to pay interest of principal on debt obligations.” Id. See
also
Adam
Hayes,
Event
of
Default,
INVESTOPEDIA
(Nov.
29,
2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/event-of-default.asp (last visited Jan. 22, 2022). Typical events of
default are non-payment or late payment of interest, breach of material representations and warranties or
covenants, and insolvency. Id.
104. An example of a green default was when the Syracruse Industrial Development Agency, to
finance an addition to a shopping mall, issued a green bond promising to develop a 45 MW power plant
running on soybean and recycled cooking oils, enough solar panels to cover six football fields, and 7 MW
worth of fuel cells. The issuer never delivered on its promises. See Motoko Aizawa, Green Bonds: a
reflection by Climate Bonds Senior Fellow Motoko Aizawa from our NYC legal workshop, CLIMATE
BONDS INITIATIVE (May 3, 2015), https://www.climatebonds.net/2015/05/reflections-legal-issuesassociated-green-bonds-reflection-climate-bonds-senior-fellow.
105. BBVA Prospectus, supra note 75, at 36.
106. Id. at 37. Nor will failure to fulfill any green commitments or related actions such as reporting
lead to an obligation for BBVA to redeem the bond. Id.
107. Id. at 41.
108. See id. (“Green Projects may not meet any or all investor expectations regarding such ‘green’ or
other equivalently-labelled performance objectives or fulfil any environmental, social, sustainability
and/or other criteria or guidelines with which such investor is or its investments are required to comply.”).
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been applied in the green loan market and might be viable in green
conventional bond terms.109 Application to green CoCos, however, would
prejudice the bond’s function as AT1 capital110 and is therefore explicitly
stated by the European Banking Authority to be ineligible with the CRR
criteria for AT1 capital instruments.111
The weak investor protection ties to the fact that there is no legal
definition of green, something BBVA also emphasizes.112 The bank states
that the bond might not comply with any such definition that may be
developed in the future.113 The lack of a universal definition is one of the
main hurdles in expanding the area of green finance.114 Capital markets are
dependent on standardization and precise definitions because these features
limit the need for negotiation between involved parties in every
transaction.115 Unclarity and disparity in practice harm market efficiency and
increase transactional costs. Lack of standardization leaves investors reliant
on their own research116 and leads some investors to stay away from green
bonds.117 Moreover, it may be difficult to tie legal obligations to a criterion
that has no universally agreed upon definition. Although BBVA references
the GBP and the EU Taxonomy Regulation in its own definition of a “Green
Project,” BBVA seems to hedge its commitments when the bank also
includes projects eligible under its SDGs, a non-binding document. As long
as banks and other issuers can retain this flexibility while successfully
marketing their financial products, the uncertainty surrounding the content
of definitions of “green” can be expected to persist.

109. Freeburn & Ramsay, supra note, 102 at 26; Kristina Forsbacka & Gregor Vulturius, A Legal
Analysis of Terms and Conditions for Green Bonds: Focus in the Financial Markets in the Nordics, 3
EUROPAR. . .TTSLIG TIDSSKRIFT 397, 435 (2019), https://ssfc.wpenginepowered.com/wpcontent/uploads/2022/05/Forsbacka_Vulturius_2019.pdf.
110. Tessa Walsh, Debate continues on green bank sub debt, INT’L FIN. REV. (July 24, 2020),
https://www.ifre.com/story/2466034/debate-continues-on-green-bank-sub-debt-l5n2ev3xx.
111. European Banking Authority, supra note 33, at 30-31.
112. BBVA Prospectus, supra note 75, at 40.
113. Id.
114. Several commentators highlight the need for standardization. See, e.g., Deschryver & de Mariz,
supra note 42, at 11.
115. See, e.g., Cenzi Garcaro, Karsten Wöckener, Olga Fedosova & Mindy Haumand, The new EU
Green Bond Regulation – Fortune Green or Fortress Green?, WHITE & CASE: ALERT (July 23, 2021),
https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/new-eu-green-bond-regulation-fortune-green-or-fortressgreen.
116. From interviewing market participants, Deschryver and de Mariz found that 28% relied on their
own due diligence, and an equal amount relied on external certification. See Deschryver & de Mariz,
supra note 42, at 11.
117. Some describe the amount of research necessary for investors to verify a bond’s real green
credentials before investing is “disproportionate,” see Madeleine Taylor, Just How Green are “Green”
Bonds? Issuers Come Under Scrutiny as Supply and Demand Mushroom, INST. ASSET MANAGER (Aug.
13,
2020),
https://web.archive.org/web/20210906010945/https://www.institutionalassetmanager.co.uk/2020/08/13/
288568/just-how-green-are-green-bonds-issuers-come-under-scrutiny-supply-and-demand.
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ii. The regulation does not ensure additionality
BBVA suggested it will spend some of the proceeds from the green
CoCo to redeem an existing CoCo from 2016 that pays a higher coupon.118
The issue of refinancing outstanding debt with new, green-labelled debt, ties
to the more general problem with demonstration of environmental
additionality from green bonds. Additionality is essentially to add something
“extra” in relation to a reference point.119 As such, to require additionality
from green bonds is to require causation between the investment in the bond
and the positive environmental impact that the proceeds are being used for,
and that this impact would not have come without the investment.120 Current
green bond standards do not require that issuers demonstrate such
additionality. The use of green bonds to refinance conventional bonds is a
practical and illustrative example of this deficiency. Refinancing is permitted
under both the GBP, the CBS, and the EuGB Proposal.121 In fact, most bonds,
including green bonds, “refinance green projects or assets after the project
construction phase is complete.”122 When a green bond is used to refinance
already initiated green activities in this way, purchasing the bond does not
contribute to additional environmental benefits beyond those that would
have come from issuance of the conventional bond.123 This undermines green
bonds’ potential as a climate change tool.
Some green finance practitioners argue that additionality is an unfair
demand,124 and that “…the raison d’être of the green bond market is not the
118. Marcus Ashworth & Elissa Martinuzzi, A CoCo Bond That Wants to Save the World,
BLOOMBERG QUINT (July 10, 2020), https://www.bloombergquint.com/gadfly/bbva-sells-a-coco-bondthat-wants-to-save-the-world.
119. Michael Gillenwater, What is Additionality? Part 1: A long standing Problem, Version 03,
GREENHOUSE
GAS
MGMT.
INST.
21
(Jan.
2012),
https://ghginstitute.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/04/AdditionalityPaper_Part-1ver3FINAL.pdf.
120. S Such a description is consistent with more general definitions of additionality. See, e.g., Steve
Carr et al., Additionality Guide Third Edition 1, ENG. P’SHIP (Oct. 2008),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1915
11/Additionality_Guide_0.pdf: “Additionality is the extent to which something happens as a result of an
intervention that would not have occurred in the absence of the intervention.” The definition is similar to
that sometimes referred to as impact investing, where an “impact” is made only where “an investment
increase[s] the quantity or quality of the enterprise’s social output beyond what would otherwise have
occurred.” Paul Brest & Kelly Born, Unpacking the Impact in Impact Investing, STANFORD SOC.
INNOVATION
REV.
(Aug.
14,
2013),
https://ssir.org/articles/entry/unpacking_the_impact_in_impact_investing.
121. ICMA, supra note 17, at 4; Note, Climate Bonds Initiative, supra note 17, at 3; Note, EuGB
Proposal, supra note 19, Article 4(3).
122. Sean Kidney, Green Bond Additionality: The Big Picture, BONDS & LOANS (Dec. 25, 2018),
https://bondsloans.com/news/green-bond-additionality-the-big-picture.
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., Ryan Jones et al., supra note 35; Jacob Michaelsen, Green bonds: A Different Take on
‘Additionality’,
ENV’T
FIN.
(Oct.
26,
2018),
https://www.environmentalfinance.com/content/analysis/green-bonds-a-different-take-on-additionality.html; Peter Cripps, Green
Bond Comment, August 2018: Upgrading the Hot Air Balloon, ENV’T FIN. (Aug. 1, 2018),
https://www.environmental-finance.com/content/analysis/green-bond-comment-august-2018upgrading-the-hot-air-balloon.html.
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direct impact of the green bond itself but rather the broader aspects around
the integration of sustainability into the financial discussion. . ..”125 The
popularity of green bonds is inducing companies and other issuers to create
a “stronger internal strategy of green” which can be viewed as “a form of
additionality.”126 Therefore, one should assess green bonds’ longer-term
impact rather than searching for additionality from individual bonds. And
there definitely is a case to be made for more tangible effects of green bonds.
Green bonds highlight the issuer’s sustainability objective to all
stakeholders.127 Even when simply refinancing unlabeled bonds, the
certification process provides transparency, enabling investors to better
assess the funded project’s environmental impact over time.128 Refinancing
also frees up more capital for the issuer to spend on transitioning to a more
sustainable operation.129
However, the tangible, real environmental impacts—the type of
impacts that are needed to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement and
Glasgow Climate Pact—remain limited. For example, Germany’s green
government bonds do not funnel additional funds to sustainability projectsis
already planned, regardless of how the bonds are labeled.130 The effect is
even more obvious when the green bond refinances old debt. Then, the
spending is not only planned, but executed. By allowing refinancing,
therefore, the BBVA issuance might be financially well-founded, but not
necessarily a great win for the climate.

IV. LEGALITY OF GREEN COCOS UNDER AT1 ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA
Green CoCos do not only have problematic consequences—they might
even contradict the CRR eligibility criteria for AT1 capital. Financial
instruments only qualify as AT1 instruments if the provisions governing
them include no incentive for the issuing institution to redeem them.131 EU
regulators have so far not struck down on green CoCos. The regulators do
however have broad discretion in determining whether the formal
requirements are met, and their view might change as the importance of
green assets increases.132 And the European Banking Authority has already
commented on technical features such as links between performance of the
125. Michaelsen, supra note 124.
126. Kidney, supra note 122. See also Aaron Maltais & Björn Nykvist, Understanding the Role of
Green Bonds in Advancing Sustainability, 11 J. OF SUSTAINABLE FIN. AND INV. (2021),
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/20430795.2020.1724864. Study respondents “are more
consistent in pointing to benefits such as attracting customers and staff, mainstreaming sustainability into
internal operations, and broader signaling effects….” Green bonds are “perceived to provide incentives
to issuers to raise the ‘green ambitions’ of specific projects and their organizations.” Id.
127. EU Technical Expert Group on Sustainable Finance, supra note 69, at 19.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Krahnen et al., supra note 71, at 15.
131. CRR Article 52(1)(g).
132. European Banking Authority, supra note 33, at 31.
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bond and the performance of the underlying green assets. Such features can
be seen as incentives to redeem before the time of performance assessment
because the issuer faces the risk of paying fees or higher yields if the
environmental targets are not met. These types of mechanisms should
therefore “not be allowed or encouraged . . . .”133 But how about not purely
financial incentives, such as an issuer’s fear of reputational harm from not
complying with its own green framework? Can that constitute an “incentive
to redeem” under the CRR?
Green instruments are, as mentioned, partly about messaging. Issuers
and other market participants want to show stakeholders, regulators, and the
public that they are making an effort to facilitate the transition into a
sustainable economy. Even when the issuer, pursuant to the bond
documentation, legally has the right, like BBVA, to change the purpose of
the bond if there are no more green projects to fund, there still is a
reputational incentive to redeem the bond. An issuer that has built an image
as green, committed to communicating its green objectives to investors,
would recognize how not redeeming could hurt business. The situation could
also be that a bank group undergoes restructuring, and the green CoCo is
placed to a part of the group without green assets. Since the environmental
purpose of the instrument would no longer be there, investors might pressure
the issuer to redeem the bond.134
Whether such sustainability-linked, non-technical incentives violate the
eligibility criteria for AT1 capital or not135 an incentive to redeem shall mean
“all features that provide, at the date of issuance, an expectation that the
capital instrument is likely to be redeemed.” Article 20(2) provides a list of
forms of incentives. These are largely technical in nature, indicating that
other types of incentives might not be covered by the law. Still, this
understanding is not supported by any explicit statement.
One of the listed forms of incentives is “a marketing of the instrument
in a way which suggests to investors that the instrument will be called.”136 It
is an extra burden for an issuing bank to maintain, virtually in perpetuity, a
green portfolio of fundable assets. Marketing a CoCo as green might
therefore suggest that the CoCo will be called because investors understand
that the bank may not cope with this burden. As mentioned, the issuer might
not have a legal obligation to redeem even though it would violate its own
framework by not doing so. The motivation to show investors and others that
it performs in line with green promises could nonetheless lead to redemption.

133. Id. at 30-31. The EBA concluded that “step-up and/or fees based on missing certain ESG targets
or other performance indicators” could be seen as incentives to redeem.
134. See Michael Benyaya’s prediction in BIHCapital, supra note 68, at 38.
135. Commission Delegated Regulation 241/2014 of Jan. 7, 2014, Supplementing Regulation
575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards for
Own Funds requirements for institutions, 2014 O.J. (L 74) 8, 26.
136. Id. at Article 20(2)(f).
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Regardless of whether a non-technical sustainability-linked incentive
fits into Article 20(2)(f), it might still fall under the broader definition in the
first paragraph. The list in Article 20(2) does not appear to be exhaustive.
The wording “shall include” is not clear in this regard but does not exclude
the possibility that other forms of incentives may fall under the rule. The
regulator EBA does not view the list as exhaustive. Because of constant
innovation in financial engineering, the regulator cannot foresee all
mechanisms that might constitute redemption incentives.137 Regulators will
therefore always be able to exercise discretion.138 As such, any form of
incentive may in theory be an incentive covered by the law. The word
“feature” in Article 20(1) does not exclude non-technical features, and under
its plain meaning, the green label of a CoCo could be a “feature” of an
instrument. Moreover, considering that the purpose of the rule is to improve
the quality of capital by ensuring permanence,139 one could take a broader
view in which any feature that enables or increases the chance of redemption
constitutes a “feature” under the law. A motivation to maintain a green
reputation fits well into this scheme. And, finally, the EU’s enactment of its
Green Deal shows the importance of sustainability and green finance at the
Union’s current state of evolution. The notion of “green” is no longer an
intangible thing but, especially since the enactment of the EU Taxonomy
Regulation, a more precise and functional term. This development suggests
that an issuer’s motivation to stay green should be taken into account by both
issuers and regulators when determining if a CoCo feature constitutes an
incentive to redeem.
The term “likely” in Article 20(1) of the Delegated Regulation,
however, may be more problematic to apply to non-technical standards. The
wording suggests that there needs to be more than a 50% chance for the
issuer to redeem the bond. A step-up mechanism, for example, gives
mathematical grounds for assessing that an issuer, based on rational
economic considerations, will redeem the bond. When the feature of the
bond gives more intangible motivations to redeem, such as possible pressure
from investors who want to ensure that they themselves comply with internal
investing mandates to stay green, the assessment necessarily becomes more
uncertain. In any event, it might be hard, at the time of issuance, to determine
whether the issuer will run out of green projects.

137. European Banking Authority, EBA Final Draft Regulatory Technical Standards on own Funds
(Part 1) Under Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, EBA/RTS/2013/01, at 54-55 (July 26, 2013),
https://www.eba.europa.eu/sites/default/documents/files/documents/10180/359901/d1217588-ff054063-8d6f-5d7c81f2cc64/EBA-RTS-2013-01-draft-RTS-on-Own-Funds-Part-1.pdf?retry=1.
138. Id. at 55.
139. Id. at 44; László Seregdi, A Prohibition on Incentive to Redeem in Capital Regulation, 7 ECON.
AND FIN. 3 352, 353 (Sept. 2020), http://real.mtak.hu/115839/1/352-364ESeregdi.pdf. The economic
rationale is that it will contravene the purpose of permanence if the features of the bond suggest that the
originally perpetual bond in reality will have shorter maturity. The investor would then only plan to hold
the bond until redemption, as opposed to a longer term. Id. at 356-357.
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The uncertainty suggests that whether non-technical sustainabilitylinked incentives fall under the CRR criteria, must be determined on a caseby-case basis. The regulator could then consider the issuer’s amount of green
assets at the time of issuance, as well as its record of funding green projects.
Such considerations would fall in line with the fact that the regulator has
wide discretion in determining eligibility. Discretion is in itself an issue,
however, especially in relation to a novel instrument such as green CoCos,
because it fosters insecurity for issuers. EBA did not discuss non-technical
incentives in a June 2021 report on the monitoring of AT1 instruments. Still,
EBA will “continue to monitor and assess these features going forward.”140
Incentives such as avoiding a reputation for greenwashing may be, albeit
more indirectly, found to be based on financial motivations. It is in practice
not always easy to determine what is an incentive and what is not.141 The last
word is likely not said on non-technical incentives to redeem.

V. IMPROVING GREEN COCOS AS A CLIMATE CHANGE TOOL BY RINGFENCING GREEN BANK ENTITIES
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that investors to whom
sustainability is a major concern should deter from investing in green
CoCos.142 These instruments are simply not applicable as effective climate
change tools under current regulation. But even though investors enlighten
themselves about the reality of the product, the branding as green remains
misleading considering the lack of guarantees of greenness that legally can
accompany it. Solutions to how green CoCos may in fact become green,
should therefore be explored.
One promising option is to ring-fence green parts of bank groups into
independent legal sub-entities in the group. In general, ring-fencing can be
done with fences of varying heights. A virtual (or low) ring-fence may be
built through accounting techniques, separating a portion of an entity’s
financial assets from the rest.143 Separation of specific assets and liabilities
within a group into different legal entities under a parent company, which is
140. European Banking Authority, supra note 33, at 31.
141. László Seregdi, supra note 139, at 357.
142. Louie Woodall suggests that “the dual nature of this CoCo may deter some who don’t like the
idea that their green capital could underwrite non-green assets.” Louie Woodall, Building green
fortresses: Should banks’ climate-friendly assets be ring-fenced?, CLIMATE RISK REV. (July 13, 2020),
https://web.archive.org/web/20220518194225/https://www.climateriskreview.com/p/building-greenfortresses.
143. Will Kenton, Ring-Fence, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/ringfence.asp
(last updated June 15, 2020). In the standard green bond market, investors emphasize the importance of
ring-fencing and overall transparency, but ring-fencing remains an unusual approach for issuers. See, e.g.,
Office of the New York City Comptroller, A GREEN BOND PROGRAM FOR NEW YORK CITY 3 (Apr. 2015),
https://comptroller.nyc.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Green_Bond_Program_Update.pdf;
Julius
Huttunen & James Rich, Green Bonds: Peeling Back the Label, AEGON ASSET MGMT. 2 (Jan. 2021),
https://www.aegonam.com/globalassets/aam/news—insights/responsible-investing/1-14-21-greenbonds-peeling-back-the-label/aegonam_green_bonds_peeling_back_the_label.pdf.
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the relevant method here, is a higher, and more of a true, ring-fence. One
example of bank group ring-fencing exists in UK prudential regulation.144
The largest UK banks are required to separate their retail banking from their
investment banking activities.145 The purpose is to avoid adverse effects on
the banks’ core services and promote depositor protection.146 This
requirement is, like the capital requirements, motivated by experience from
the 2007–08 financial crisis. By separating the riskier investment banking
activity from the retail activity, such as providing mortgages to the general
public, the financial infrastructure is more shielded from adverse impacts
from speculative activities. A similar type of ring-fence for green entities,
however, has yet to be implemented by any prudential regulator.
Fundamentally, a green ring-fence would have to balance the interest in
facilitating the transition to a sustainable economy with the purpose of
CoCos as capital instruments ensuring financial stability. The idea is to
separate a bank group’s green assets into own sub-entities. Each entity—
each “side of the fence”—would then have to meet capital and liquidity
requirements on its own. When it comes to the suitability of green CoCos as
a climate change tool, the most important and obvious benefit is that in a
wholly green entity there are only green losses to absorb with equity–from
any conversion that may be effectuated. This would ensure the greenness of
the capital instrument not only as debt, but also after conversion.
Furthermore, the separation of green and non-green may give the green entity
better terms with investors, because their credit rating would be higher
considering the reduced climate change risks related to non-green assets.147
The green bank entity may also be put under easier capital requirements
from prudential regulators. This would not only be positive for the entity but
also reduce the risk of bond conversion. Regulators are currently
contemplating to introduce such a green supporting factor (GSF) as an
interim measure until green becomes the new norm.148 The idea is to facilitate
144. Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013. The EU decided against a Commission proposal
for a regulation containing similar rules. See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and
of the Council on Structural Measures Improving the Resilience of EU Credit Institutions, COM (2014)
43 final (Jan. 29, 2014)., and the subsequent withdrawal, Withdrawal of Commission Proposals, 2018/C
233/05, 2018 O.J. (C. 233) 6. As such, there are currently no ring-fencing requirements in the EU/EEA
area.
145. Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013, c. 33, § 142C (UK).
146. Id. at Section 1.
147. See Woodall, supra note 142; See also S&P Global Ratings’ general criteria for incorporating
ESG
principles
in
credit
ratings,
S&P
GLOB.
RATINGS
(Oct.
10,
2021),
https://disclosure.spglobal.com/ratings/en/regulatory/article/-/view/sourceId/12085396.
148. See EU High-Level Expert Group on Sustainable Finance, Financing a Sustainable European
Economy: Final Report 2018 (Jan, 31, 2018), https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/180131sustainable-finance-final-report_en.pdf. Hungary has already introduced a GSF related to Pillar 2 capital
requirements (AT1 capital is part of Pillar 1). In early 2021, the Central Bank of Hungary (Magyar
Nemzeti Bank (MNB)), introduced a program that eases part of or all capital requirements for
environmentally sustainable corporate and municipal exposures that meet certain criteria. MAGYAR
NEMZETI BANK (MNB), PREFERENTIAL CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS PROGRAM FOR GREEN CORPORATE AND
MUNICIPAL FINANCING (ENGLISH SUMMARY) (Aug. 31, 2021), https://www.mnb.hu/letoltes/preferential-
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and incentivize lending to green activities by lowering the lending bank’s
capital requirements when providing such loans.149 To minimize the risk of
a green bubble following overvaluation of green assets,150 a GSF should be
based on an actual risk differential between green and non-green assets. It
should not be based on the green feature of the assets in itself because, if the
risk is the same but the capital buffers smaller, any losses arising from green
exposures would, by definition, be insufficiently covered by the bank’s
resources.151 A differentiated risk might very well be justified because the
Paris Agreement has made carbon-intensive assets riskier than green
assets.152 So far, however, there is no evidence of “significantly lower risk at
the micro-level,”153 indicating that it might be too early to introduce a GSF.
Moreover, any effects of a GSF may be limited compared to other
measures.154 The idea of a GSF is also criticized.155 Another proposed option,
either in combination with a GSF or on its own, is a brown penalty factor
(BP).156 In any event, whether brown portfolios are penalized, green
portfolios awarded, both, or no explicit differentiation is made through
regulation, a ring-fenced green entity would be positioned to receive
preferable treatment caused by potential systematic changes in how the
markets perceive and deal with climate risk. Therefore, a green ring-fence
presents an opportunity that is beneficial not only to the environment, but
also to the business of banks.
Implementation of green ring-fencing would admittedly pose
challenges. Separating green assets from non-green assets could undermine
the main rationale behind CoCos, which is to ensure financial stability by
enabling the banks to sustain themselves with capital. Ring-fencing limits
the ability of the entity’s stronger parts to support weaker parts because the
capital is compartmentalized across different legally separated group
entities, thus weakening banks’ overall capital resilience.157 And on a more
capital-requirements-for-green-corporate-and-municipal-financing-summary.pdf. These exposures must
in large part be towards EU Taxonomy Regulation- or CBS-eligible activities. Id. The program was
recently extended due to its success. Press Release, Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB), Banks Will Soon
Have A Wider Variety Of Green Loans To Offer To Companies And Local Governments (Sept. 1, 2021),
https://www.mnb.hu/en/pressroom/press-releases/press-releases-2021/banks-will-soon-have-a-widervariety-of-green-loans-to-offer-to-companies-and-local-governments.
149. EU High-Level Expert Group on Sustainable Finance, supra note 148, at 68.
150. Fernando Restroy, The role of prudential policy in addressing climate change, BIS MGMT.
SPEECHES (Oct. 22, 2021), https://www.bis.org/speeches/sp211008.htm.
151. Id.
152. EU High-Level Expert Group on Sustainable Finance, supra note 148, at 69.
153. Id. at 68.
154. Jakob Thom. . . & Anuschka Hilke, The Green Supporting Factor: Quantifying the impact on
European banks and green finance, 2 DEGREES INVESTING INITIATIVE, WORKING PAPER NO. 1 (Apr.
2018), https://2degrees-investing.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/The-Green-Supporting-Factor.pdf.
155. Restroy, supra note 148.
156. See, e.g., EU High-Level Expert Group on Sustainable Finance, supra note 148, at 68.
157. Wilson Ervin finds that pervasive ring-fencing may increase bank failure risk by a large multiple.
Wilson
Ervin,
THE
RISKY
BUSINESS
OF
RING-FENCING
(Dec.
12,
2017),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3085649. See also Taylor, supra note 117.
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practical note, the mere infrastructure of green ring-fencing could be
difficult.158 Green finance is not, unlike retail banking or investment banking,
a banking segment of its own. Rather, it is a sub-activity within different
segments, for example in the form of green investment within the segment
asset management.
However, the work on precise definitions has already come a long way.
The newly adopted and continuously developed EU Taxonomy Regulation
represents important progress in that regard. Moreover, the argument that
ring-fencing impairs financial stability might not be as relevant when it
comes to green ring-fencing. Green is the future, and allowing green entities
to thrive on their own, unencumbered by any implications of the transitional
risks associated with brown assets, could actually improve the banks’
resilience.
This is fundamentally the same idea on which the UK ring-fencing
scheme is based. The riskier investment banking activity is separated from
the safer retail banking activity, aiming to improve the resilience of the retail
division. Drawing the parallel here is not meant as neither a defense nor a
critique of that regime.159 The point is merely to use the group structures the
Banking Reform made the banks create as inspiration for a green ringfencing scheme. For example, the British bank Barclays established Barclays
Bank UK PLC (BBUKPLC) as a new, ring-fenced bank.160 As a sub-group
of the listed entity Barclays PLC, the new bank provides day-to-day products
and services to individuals and small and medium-sized enterprises.
BBUKPLC operates alongside, but independently from, the non-ring-fenced
sub-group Barclays Bank PLC. This entity was continued from before the
ring-fence operation, and does now solely serve Barclays’ larger corporate,
wholesale, and international banking clients. Although independent banks,
the entities both remain part of the group Barclays PLC. This allows them to
retain synergy effects they had pre-ring-fencing, such as shared services.161
Still, the separate sub-groups are independently rated by credit agencies.162
158. In a 2014 paper, Deloitte presented several issues arising for banks that were to adapt to the
European Commission proposal on ring-fencing and the UK Banking Reform. DELOITTE, STRUCTURAL
REFORM
OF
EU
BANKING:
REARRANGING
THE
PIECES
(2014),
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/uk/Documents/financial-services/deloitte-uk-fsstructural-reform-eu-banking-april-14.pdf. Many of these issues would be relevant under a green ringfencing scheme, such as ensuring compliance with minimum regulatory and supervisory requirements,
choosing an optimal business model and strategy, modelling of capital and funding, designing operating
models and governance frameworks, and other transactional issues associated with legal entity change.
159. The UK scheme faces criticism. See, e.g., David Wighton, Barclays results show ringfencing
critics were spot on, FIN. NEWS (July 29, 2020), https://www.fnlondon.com/articles/barclays-resultsshow-ringfencing-critics-were-spot-on-20200729.
160. Ring-Fencing
Explained, BARCLAYS,
https://home.barclays/who-we-are/ring-fencingexplained/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2022).
161. At Barclays, Barclays Services Limited delivers services to the Barclays Group and its divisions.
Id.
162. See the overview of current credit ratings of the Barclays sub-groups here: Credit Ratings,
BARCLAYS,
https://home.barclays/investor-relations/fixed-income-investors/creditratings/#standardpoors (last visited Jan. 22, 2022).
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Similarly, a bank’s riskier brown activities could be separated from its
green activities in a sibling structure, where the sub-entities, sitting side-byside under a holding company, deal with each other at an arm’s length
distance (i.e., commercial terms). This would promote stability by improving
resilience of the green entity. It might even help mitigate a future market
crash caused by devaluation of non-green assets due to climate risk. And
when the green entity no longer would have to subsidize the climate risk in
the non-green entity, the green entity would have more capital available to
grant sustainable loans. Combined with preferable terms incentivizing banks
to grow their green entities, this would expedite the transition to a sustainable
economy. Because immense amounts of capital are needed for the green
shift, any instrument that legitimately and transparently can help that shift,
should be applied. Green ring-fencing is a way to enable green CoCos to be
such an instrument.

VI. CONCLUSION
This paper demonstrates that green CoCos’ inherent features render the
instrument deficient as a climate change tool under current prudential
regulation. The main issue is that the bonds, at any time, can be converted
into equity. Thus, banks cannot guarantee that investing in the bonds will
make any real, positive environmental impact. Investors might even end up
inflicting more harm than good if the losses absorbed by the CoCo, are nongreen. Consequently, the issuing banks’ commitments to sustainability
appear illusory. CoCos play a particular and critical role in supporting the
banking system. Adding to them a feature of promoting environmental
sustainability, unaccompanied by regulatory changes, is a failed attempt at
simultaneous use.163
Current and proposed green bond standards are inadequate to regulate
the greenness of CoCos. Application of these standards to CoCos have
several undesirable consequences, some of which are due to the requirements
of bank capital instruments under prudential regulation, others of which
follow from the standards themselves. As such, CoCos do not fit into current
regulatory frameworks for green finance. Regulators know investors will
bear the losses if the banks are required to use the bonds to absorb losses,
and it therefore seems reactionary, if not hypocritical, for regulators working
towards a more sustainable economy to allow green labeling of CoCos. The
discussion on the prohibition of incentives to redeem the bond in CoCo
documentation, shows that green CoCos should perhaps be disallowed
altogether under current market regulations.
To improve green CoCos applicability as a climate change tool, this
paper suggests introducing ring-fencing of banks’ green assets into separate
legal entities. This will ensure that the bonds only absorb losses from green
assets upon conversion. Given CoCos inherent and very intentional design163. Ashworth & Martinuzzi, supra note 118.
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feature as a regulatory capital instrument to cover a bank’s losses in a crisis,
it is hard to see how these instruments can hold a legitimate green
accreditation without further regulatory changes. Therefore, unless a system
of green ring-fencing can be successfully implemented, use of green CoCos,
even if deemed to fulfill AT1 capital requirements, should be discontinued.

